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I
The question of whether constitutional interpretation ought to emphasize
the intended meanings of the Framers, as discerned from the text itself and
relevant historical sources, remains a highly charged political issue.
Conservatives generally espouse originalist methodology as a basis for
rejecting the liberal court decisions and "judicial activism" of the 1960s,'
while liberals reject the originalists' methodological claims and defend the
propriety of judicial discretion, which has tended to produce outcomes to
which they are sympathetic.2 With To Secure These Rights, Scott D. Gerber
enters the debate over the Framers' intent by rejecting the presumption that a
"jurisprudence of original intention" need be a "jurisprudence of the right;"
Gerber attempts, instead, to develop a "liberal originalis[t]" theory of
constitutional interpretation, one which, though faithful to original intent, yields
liberal results (pp. 4-7).
Gerber's call for a liberal originalism is intriguing, but the particular
originalist vision he offers is less than compelling. Gerber argues that the
Constitution's drafters intended their creation to achieve one central purpose:
the protection of the natural rights delineated in the Declaration of
Independence. The Declaration, according to Gerber, expressed the Lockean
natural rights theory that animated the Revolution. The Constitution, in turn,
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1. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW (1990) (defending originalist position on constitutional interpretation); Edwin Meese III, Toward a
Jurisprudence of Original Intent, II HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5 (1988) (same); William H. Rehnquist, The
Notion of a Living Constitution, in VIEWS FROM THE BENCH: THE JUDICIARY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS 127 (Mark W. Cannon & David M. O'Brien eds., 1985) (rejecting notion that Constitution should
be conceived of as evolving document); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
849 (1989) (advocating originalist methodology as best approach to constitutional interpretation).
2. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEx. L. REv. 433 (1986) (advocating approach to constitutional interpretation that
centers on what text means in our time); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885 (1985) (arguing Framers intended Constitution to evolve through its
interpretation in accordance with modem conditions and values); Laurence H. Tribe, Bicentennial Blues:
To Praise the Constitution or To Bury It? 37 Am. U. L. REV. 1 (1987) (rejecting originalist emphasis on
Framers' intent).
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established a national governmental structure for the protection of those rights.
The Supreme Court, as the ultimate protector of these rights, properly enjoys
the role of final arbiter of constitutional interpretation. Unfortunately, Gerber's
argument is crippled by the inadequacy of his historical scholarship and by his
sometimes unrealistic view of the American political system today.
II
Gerber begins with a discussion of the intellectual climate and political
philosophy of the Revolutionary Era. Looking both to primary sources and to
the arguments advanced by an earlier generation of historians who identified
the character of the American Revolution as firmly rooted in the Lockean
theory of natural rights,3 Gerber rejects the prevailing trend in Revolutionary
historiography, "republican revisionism."'4 Instead, he asserts that "on the issue
of the basic purpose of government-the issue of preeminent concern to
constitutional interpretation ... the intellectual leaders were Lockean liberals,
not classical republicans" (p. 33); the Declaration of Independence, in Gerber's
view, expressed "the essential political premise of the American regime...
that government exists to secure natural rights, not to cultivate virtue" (p. 40).
Gerber then contends that "the primary goal of [the Constitution was] to
provide the institutional means to secure the natural-rights philosophical ends
of the Declaration" (p. 59). Gerber argues that the preamble to the
Constitution, the framing and ratification debates, and the Federalist Papers
all demonstrate that "the Founders remained as dedicated to natural-rights
principles during the period of the framing and ratification of the Constitution
as they had been during the heyday of the American Revolution" (p. 90).
Based on this reading of the Framers' intent, Gerber argues in the second
part of the book that the proper role of the Supreme Court is to be the
guardian of the natural rights of the people and, thus, the final arbiter of
constitutional interpretation. Gerber argues that, as the Framers became
increasingly suspicious of the legislative branch's ability to protect citizens'
3. In thus depicting the Revolution as Lockean in character, Gerber seems strongly influenced by the
work of a previous generation of Revolutionary historians, such as Carl Becker and Louis Hartz, see
generally CARL L. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 27-30, 71-79 (6th prtg. 1956)
(describing Locke's influence on Founders); Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 50-64
(1955) (same), and natural rights interpreters of the Constitution, including Harry Jaffa and Walter Murphy,
all of whose works he cites frequently.
4. Republican revisionism, or the "republican synthesis," de-emphasizes the influence of Locke and
natural rights theory on the intellectual leaders of the Revolution and points to the influence of classical
republicanism, the importance of the concept of virtue, and the contributions of British Whig, Scottish, and
Continental political thought to the Revolutionaries' political outlook. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION at xi-xii, 34-54 (1967); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION
462-67, 506-52 (1975); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 at
vii-ix, 6-9, 48-70 (1969). See generally Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism and Early American
Historiography, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 29 (1986) (reviewing briefly central ideas of republican synthesis.)
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natural rights, especially in light of the failures of the national and state
governments under the Articles of Confederation, they moved from the
traditional English model of legislative supremacy to one recognizing the
validity of judicial review (pp. 99-100).
Gerber also appeals to the structure of the Constitution to support his
contention that the Framers intended the Court to act as the final interpreter of
that document. Gerber asserts that "the Founders' acceptance of judicial
finality is evident in the structure of government they embodied in the
Constitution, specifically in the complementary mechanisms of separation of
powers and checks and balances," since "[w]ithout the power of definitive
judicial review" the Court would have no effective check on the other two
branches (p. 128). Gerber also notes that, without one branch as final
interpreter, "constitutional gridlock" would occur and that the meritocratic
judiciary has particular institutional competence as a textual interpreter
(p. 133).
Having set forth his conception of the appropriate role of the judiciary in
constitutional interpretation, Gerber moves on to address the restraints available
to "prevent the Court's role as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution from
devolving into the unacceptable state of government by judiciary" (p. 134).
According to Gerber, the checks placed upon the Court by the
Constitution-the Article V amendment process (pp. 139-44), impeachment
(pp. 144-49),5 judicial self-restraint (pp. 150-54), and the judicial appointment
process (pp. 154-60)-if exercised to the extent intended by the Framers, "can
help ensure that the Court interprets the Constitution in accordance with the
natural-rights philosophy of the Declaration of Independence, rather than in
light of the moral and political convictions of particular justices" (p. 161).
Gerber concludes the volume by applying a natural rights theory of
constitutional interpretation to a handful of the issues recently confronted by
the Court, including discrimination and abortion (pp. 164-95). Gerber
acknowledges that the views of the Framers need not control the outcome of
modem cases, since their views on issues such as racial and sexual equality
were not always consistent with the natural rights theory embodied in the
Declaration and the Constitution (p. 165). But he still attempts to demonstrate
"that the political philosophy of the Declaration of Independence is sufficiently
determinate to be a practical guide to judgment in individual cases that come
before the Court" (p. 162).
5. In proposing partial reliance on the impeachment power to prevent judges from deciding issues
based on their own political and moral preferences, Gerber makes an interesting argument that such
attempts to amend the Constitution outside the Article V process qualify as "high crimes and
misdemeanors" and thus constitute grounds for impeachment, since "nothing could more 'subvert the
Constitution' than intentionally disregarding the philosophical principles on which [it] is erected" (p. 149).
Gerber goes on to insist, "[a]s unsettling as the impeachment process may sometimes seem, the Constitution
requires that it be sometimes used" and that "only if the impeachment power is taken more seriously [can]
the natural-rights principles upon which this nation is based... be reaffirmed" (p. 149).
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In laying the foundation for his theory of constitutional interpretation based
on natural rights, Gerber oversimplifies the extensive and influential
scholarship of the republican revisionist movement by characterizing it as
asserting that "the motivating force behind the American Revolution was not
the protection of natural rights, but the cultivation of virtue" (p. 25). Gerber's
rejection of the republican synthesis relies primarily on an examination of the
text of the Declaration of Independence and other writings by leaders of the
Revolutionary period, including Thomas Jefferson, Samuel Adams, and James
Madison. On the basis of their heavy rhetorical dependence on the language
of Locke's Second Treatise,6 Gerber declares triumphantly that the Declaration
is rooted exclusively in Lockean natural rights theory.
This attempt to redeem Revolutionary liberalism talks past the republican
revisionist movement, rather than rebutting it. Even in their strongest
statements, advocates of the republican synthesis have never denied that
Revolutionary thinkers were influenced by Locke and dependent upon Lockean
rhetoric; rather they attempted to draw attention to other significant influences,
which had been ignored by earlier generations of historians, and to demonstrate
Revolutionary leaders' willingness to borrow both rhetoric and ideas from any
and every source available to them.7 Without a definitive rebuttal of the
republican synthesis and redemption of the earlier emphasis on Locke alone,
at least with regard to the purpose of government, Gerber's demand for
constitutional interpretation based solely on natural rights theory cannot
succeed.
On the basis of his own analysis of primary sources, Gerber also dismisses
existing scholarship on the circumstances surrounding the framing and
ratification of the Constitution8 and oversimplifies the forces at work in the
Constitutional era. He shifts much of the burden of proving the Framers' intent
in drafting the Constitution back to his questionable interpretation of the
Revolutionary period. He concedes that there was "little philosophizing about
the ultimate ends of government during the confederation period" and the
6. JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 265 (Peter
Laslett ed., student ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698).
7. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 4, at 6-9 (describing varied sources upon which Revolutionary leaders
drew, including not only Locke but also thinkers in traditions of classical antiquity, Christian theology,
English empiricism, and European rationalism).
8. Gerber illustrates his contention that the historiography is flawed in its "focus mainly on contexts
at the expense of texts" by citing a few noted works on the Constitutional Convention (p. 58): JACK P.
GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE
BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES, 1607-1788 (1986) (addressing problems created by governing
large territories under Articles of Confederation); FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985) (focusing on Framers' desire to promote specific
economic and political theories); RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789 (1987)
(emphasizing inability of Articles government to address various economic and foreign policy issues).
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Convention itself,9 but he takes this silence as evidence that "the matter was
so well settled by the Declaration of Independence: the fundamental purpose
of government is to secure the natural rights of the people" (p. 63).
According to Gerber, the context in which the relevant historical
documents were created-the focus of much current historiography-is not
important for determining the 'fundamental purpose of the state" (p. 59). These
purposes must be gleaned from the texts themselves. Thus, the social, political,
and economic circumstances surrounding the drafting of the Constitution
become secondary for Gerber, leaving him free to sift the sources for phrases
and paragraphs that support his thesis regarding the preeminence of natural
rights concerns. Gerber scours the writings of leaders such as Madison, Adams,
Jefferson, and Hamilton for remarks that seem to support a sustained
commitment to Lockean natural rights theory throughout the Constitutional
period.'0 Gerber's interpretations of The Federalist and the Bill of Rights
likewise emphasize rhetoric that, while consistent with and clearly influenced
by Locke, is not necessarily dispositive of the Framers' view of the basic
purposes of government.
Even if the reader accepts Gerber's arguments regarding the Declaration
and the Constitution, it is difficult to imagine that the Court could or would
function as Gerber proposes. Regardless of whether the Framers believed that
the Court could live up to such lofty expectations, Gerber's vision of the
judiciary as an essentially apolitical defender of natural rights and his proposed
checks on the branch are often unrealistic. In emphasizing amendment and
impeachment as protections against judicial abuse and error, Gerber dismisses
claims that these processes are infrequently used because they are clumsy and
ineffective," and he overlooks the inherent difficulty in building the extensive
political consensus required to employ them. In defending the Article V
amendment process, Gerber highlights the several amendments that overturned
Supreme Court precedent as evidence that the amendment process can be used
to address judicial abuse or error.'2 But this analysis is also flawed: Gerber
9. See JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 183-91 (1979) (noting little discussion of political philosophy during
Confederation period and Constitutional Convention of 1787).
10. Gerber dismisses claims that leaders such as John Adams and Alexander Hamilton had abandoned
natural rights theory in the post-Revolutionary era; Gerber insists, for example, that even though "[i]n order
to press for his preferred strong national government, Hamilton did sometimes employ what can only be
described as a strained interpretation of Lockean liberalism.... [F]or Hamilton, as for the Framers in
general, Lockean liberalism remained the benchmark of political legitimacy" (pp. 84-85).
11. See WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1768-69 (1986);
Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary Defense of an
Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE LJ. 821, 843 (1985) (declaring Article V "very nearly a dead letter").
Gerber rejects arguments that the infrequent use of the impeachment process is a positive phenomenon
in American politics. See, e.g., JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
120 (1984); William H. Rehnquist, The Impeachment Clause: A Wild Card in the Constitution, 85 Nw. U.
L. REV. 903, 903-04 (1991).
12. Compare Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793) (holding citizen of one state may sue
another state in federal court) with U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)
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fails to note that, although Supreme Court precedents created the need for each
of these amendments, most of them were passed not in direct response to those
precedents but in response to intervening events or changes (for the Thirteenth
through Fifteenth Amendments, the Civil War and Reconstruction; for the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment, the Vietnam draft).
Gerber also depends on politicians to foster a meritocratic, nonpartisan
judiciary by abandoning the well-established practices of political appointment.
However, instead of addressing how to motivate such conduct, he asserts that
politicians have access to the necessary information and expertise, and
demands they "stop playing politics with the appointment process" (p. 160).
13
Gerber is similarly naive in relying on politicians to refrain from mounting
partisan impeachment efforts.' 4 He also demands that judges ignore their
personal beliefs in favor of whatever natural rights theory seems to require;
15
he is confident that properly selected judges are capable of exercising such
self-restraint (p. 150). Unfortunately, these political arguments, like Gerber's
historical claims, seem to be based more on preference than analysis.
-Wendy Ann Semel
(holding African-American slaves are not citizens) with U.S. CoNsT. amends. XIII, XIV, XV; Pollack v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (holding federal income tax unconstitutional) with U.S.
CONST. amend. XVI; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (holding congressional attempt to lower
voting age in state and local elections to 18 unconstitutional) with U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
13. But see DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE 98 (1988) (describing political nature of
appointment process).
14. This rejection of political impeachments comes despite Gerber's acknowledgement of President
Gerald Ford's attempt to impeach Justice William Douglas in response to congressional rejection of two
Republican Supreme Court nominees and the liberalism of the Warren Court (pp. 146-47).
15. In many cases, Gerber admits that these requirements may not presently be discernable. For
example, while he notes that natural rights theory will not be able to resolve the question of whether or not
there is a constitutional right to abortion until science can definitively determine when life begins (p. 182),
Gerber offers no suggestion how the Court ought to adjudicate the issue for the present day.
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